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The federal government has implemented an earned income tax credit – what it has called 
the Working Income Tax Benefit – in the 2007 Budget. Edmund Phelps has argued that 
the earned income tax credit in the United States should be replaced with an employment 
subsidy. This paper assesses the importance of Phelps’ concern, and related issues, for 
Canada. This debate is important for two reasons: the plight of those blocked by the 
"welfare wall" is dire, and the entire community has an interest in lower structural 
unemployment in an environment that involves an aging population and an 
accompanying labour shortage. 
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Résumé : 
Le gouvernement fédéral a mis en place un crédit d’impôt sur les revenus salariaux –  
qu’il a nommé Prestation fiscale pour le revenu gagné – dans le Budget de 2007. Edmund 
Phelps a soutenu que le crédit d’impôt sur les revenus salariaux aux États-Unis devrait 
être remplacé par une subvention à l’emploi. Cette étude évalue l’importance de la 
question soulevée par Phelps et des questions relatives à celle-ci dans le contexte du 
Canada. Le débat est important pour deux raisons: la condition de ceux qui se retrouvent 
dans l’impasse créé par le « mur du bien-être social » est très préoccupante, et la 
communauté entière a intérêt à réduire le niveau du chômage structurel dans un 
environnement caractérisé par le vieillissement de la population et la pénurie résultante 
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The federal government’s Budget Plan of 2007 contained a detailed discussion of 
the “welfare wall” – the fact that social assistance recipients face such significant 
financial barriers to paid employment that their after-tax-and-transfer-receipt resources 
can actually fall as they move into the workforce (pages 78-81). While some progress has 
been made in recent years by lowering the welfare wall for families with children, the 
government has now begun to address this problem more generally by introducing a 
Working Income Tax Benefit for all low-income Canadians. The annual funding starts at  
$500 million, and the program's scope is to increase to $1 billion annually soon.  
  It is interesting that – as the Canadian government is taking steps to catch up to its 
American counterpart on this front (the United States has had an earned income tax credit 
for 30 years) – there have been calls for disbanding the earned income tax credit program 
there. For example, Nobel laureate Edmund Phelps (1997) makes the case for replacing 
the earned income tax credit with an employment subsidy.  In Phelps’ proposal, firms 
would receive a per-person subsidy that would cover a fraction of the wage paid to each 
low-income employee. As Phelps argues (1997, pages 88, 132-134), with a subsidy to 
employers, the general level of low-skill wages would be bid up, so that even individuals 
not covered by the program would be helped. With the earned income tax credit given to 
employees, on the other hand, there is downward pressure on the pre-tax level of low-
skill wage rates, so individuals not covered by the program are hurt.    3
This paper has two purposes: first, to evaluate the relevance of Phelps’ concerns 
for Canada, and second, to assess the likely impact of Finance Canada’s specific 
initiative, by reporting some simulation results. The model that has been used to generate 
these results is outlined in sections 2 and 3 (and is listed formally in the Appendix). The 
results are discussed in sections 4 and 5, and concluding remarks are offered in section 6.    
       
2. A Framework for Evaluating Broadly Available Earned-Income-Tax-Credit and 
Employment-Subsidy Programs 
Several features are important for our model to be taken seriously as a vehicle for 
illuminating policy options for Canada. First, the production process in the model must 
allow skilled labour to be distinguished from unskilled labour, since the government 
initiatives under study apply only to the latter. For this reason, in the basic version of our 
analysis we define capital very broadly – to include both physical equipment and human 
capital (skilled labour). We report on a sensitivity test that treats these two forms of 
capital differently in the Appendix.   
The second desirable feature of a model is that it respects the “globalization” 
constraint that confronts small open economies such as Canada. Owners of capital can 
and do relocate the employment of their factors of production to achieve the most 
favourable after-tax yield. If the domestic government raises taxes on capitalists or 
skilled individuals to finance initiatives that are intended to provide support for those on 
lower incomes, skilled labour and physical capital can leave the country. We expect that 
this international reallocation of skilled labour and capital proceeds up to the point that 
after-tax yields have returned to their pre-policy levels. Our model is consistent with this   4
constraint, since the supply of broadly defined capital is assumed to be perfectly elastic at 
the level of the after-tax yield that is available elsewhere. On the other hand, since the 
unskilled are not mobile internationally, a fixed supply of such individuals is specified. 
  A third important feature of the model is that there is involuntary unemployment 
among the unskilled. This is necessary for two reasons – the model needs to be realistic 
and there must be a subset of the population that does not benefit from the policies that 
we are examining (limited as they are for those who are in work). To address Phelps’ 
concern, we need to focus on how the policies affect those who remain out of work. 
Further, it is desirable that this unemployment depend on market incentives in a standard 
fashion. After all, the underlying appeal of both the earned income tax credit and 
employment subsidies is that they try to create desirable market incentives – not 
undesirable ones (that lead individuals to stay unemployed). We satisfy this objective in 
the model by including the simplest version of efficiency-wage theory (Summers 1988). 
Given that firms are unable to perfectly monitor individual worker effort, but they want 
to induce a high level of worker motivation and productivity, firms pay a wage that is 
above the competitive level by the profit-maximizing amount. In the model, it is this 
increase in the general level of the unskilled wage that causes unemployment to persist in 
full equilibrium. There is no unemployment in the skilled labour market, since firms 
encounter no motivation problem among those who have “good jobs”. 
  The fourth important feature of the model is the government budget constraint. 
This relationship makes explicit how the government is paying for either contemplated 
initiative that is intended to alleviate part of the welfare-wall problem.   5
  The final prerequisite for an appealing analysis is that it be both optimization-
based (so that it is acceptable to mainstream professional economists) and that it be 
simplified and highly aggregative (so that it can be understood independently by the 
many non-economists who are involved in this policy debate). 
  The nine-equation system that is outlined in the remainder of this section of the 
paper defines a model that meets all the prerequisites just mentioned. For those who are 
interested, there is an Appendix that formally lists the equations, but the main text of the 
paper can be read without reference to the Appendix.  
  The input-output function is standard; output is higher if the employment of either 
broadly defined capital or unskilled labour is higher. Other things equal, more of one 
input raises output, but – given diminishing returns – by ever smaller amounts as the 
other input becomes relatively scarce. The most common specific relationship that 
embodies this feature is the Cobb-Douglas production function, which we assume. There 
is one key parameter in this relationship, which defines the share of income going to each 
factor, and we consider two assumptions when choosing a numerical value for this 
parameter. 
Initially we focus on the broad question raised by Phelps: should the government 
provide support to those on low incomes through an initiative that operates on the 
demand-side, or one that operates on the supply-side, of the labour market? That is, 
should the government offer a subsidy to firms for employing low-skilled individuals, or 
should it offer an earned income tax credit directly to those receiving low incomes? We 
consider this question by comparing situations that involve a fully developed 
commitment to one policy or the other. Specifically, we assume that each government   6
policy has been expanded so that all households that fall below the average income level 
qualify for support. We assume that there are two equal-sized groups in the population – 
one “rich” and the other “poor”. The rich derive income in two ways, by renting out the 
physical capital that they own, and by working. Since these individuals have human 
capital, they receive the skilled wage rate. The “poor” have no capital; as a result – other 
than employment-insurance receipts – their income is employment earnings, and they are 
paid the unskilled wage. We assume that all three factors of production (physical capital, 
skilled labour and unskilled labour) each receive one-third of the total income that is 
created in the production process. Since, as noted, we assume that there are equal 
numbers of skilled and unskilled individuals, the "rich” receive two-thirds of national 
income. As noted, for simplicity, we assume that human capital and physical capital can 
be lumped together, and we specify a two-factor input-output function, with the 
exponents of broadly defined capital and unskilled labour being fractions a and (1 – a). 
For realistic illustrative simulations, we calibrate by setting a equal to two-thirds.  
As explained in the appendix, we consider an alternative definition of the 
production process that separates the two forms of capital. This alternative specification 
yields very similar results.  
The modeling strategy that we have just outlined is appealing if we wish to 
investigate the relative appeal of the two broad approaches to a thorough-going attack on 
income inequality. That is, our initial simulations focus on outcomes that can be expected 
after each policy has been expanded to the point that its coverage extends to all those at 
the lower end of the economic ladder. Of course, at the current level of funding, Canada’s 
Working Income Tax Benefit does not cover anything like this proportion of the   7
population. Thus, after comparing the alternative approaches to the general problem of 
income inequality, we adjust the model to make it more suitable for assessing the limited 
initiative that the government has introduced at this time. These alterations, which 
include a very different value for the income-share parameter, a, are discussed in section 
3 below.  
  Firms choose the employment levels of the two inputs to maximize profits, and – 
in the initial set of reported simulations – they also choose the level of wages they pay 
their unskilled workers with the same objective in mind. Profits equal sales revenue 
(output) minus the rental payments made to the owners of the two factors – “capital” 
(machines and skilled workers) and unskilled workers. Firms do not get to choose the 
rental rate they pay for the internationally mobile inputs (skilled labour and capital) since 
this level of remuneration is determined in international markets by what these factors 
can receive elsewhere. Firms’ factor-demand functions are standard; they hire each of the 
factors up to the point that its marginal product is just equal to the rental payment that 
firms must pay to employ that input. The fact that firms find it profitable to use a “high” 
unskilled wage policy to induce higher productivity from its unskilled employees results 
in unemployment. The level of structural unemployment depends on five parameters. The 
higher is the workers’ aversion-to-effort parameter, the income-tax rate, and the 
employment-insurance generosity parameter, the higher is the unemployment rate; while 
the higher is the earned-income-tax-credit and employment subsidy parameter, the lower 
is the unemployment rate. In the numerical simulations, all these policy parameters are 
set to realistic values, and the aversion-to-effort parameter is chosen to generate an initial 
unemployment rate for the entire nation of 6 percent.   8
  As in Summers (1988), the level of effort on the job provided by unskilled 
workers depends on the proportionate excess of what the worker can receive (after-tax) 
from her current employer, compared to her outside option. The outside option is a 
weighted average of two possible outcomes that follow a separation from the current 
employer. Let u denote the unemployment rate. One option following a separation is that 
the individual may get another job (and, in equilibrium, receive the same wage). The 
probability of this option is the employment rate (1 – u). The other option following a 
separation is that the individual may become unemployed (and receive a fraction, f, of the 
previous wage through employment insurance). The probability of this option is the 
unemployment rate, u. Defining the outside option as z, the pre-tax unskilled wage as w, 
the tax rate as t, and the earned-income-tax-credit rate as c, we have  
  z = (1 – u)[w(1 – t(1 – c))] + ufw. 
The worker effort function forms an integral part of the derivation of the unemployment-
rate equation that was described in the previous paragraph. Further, this outside option 
relationship represents a natural measure for evaluating the alternative policies that are 
designed to help the unskilled. This is because z can be interpreted in an alternative way – 
as the average or expected income of an unskilled individual over the longer term (when 
that individual can be expected to go through periods of employment and 
unemployment). An unambiguously appealing policy is one that – simultaneously – 
lowers the unemployment rate, raises the unskilled wage rate, and lowers the effective tax 
rate – since all these measures make z higher. We focus on the effects of both the earned 
income tax credit and the employer employment subsidy below. The employment subsidy 
parameter does not directly enter the definition of z, but it has indirect effects through   9
some of the other variables, since this policy does affect the wage rate, the unemployment 
rate, and (depending on how it is financed) the tax rate.  
  For the initial set of experiments, the number of unskilled individuals who choose 
to be in the labour force is fixed (at unity). As a result, the number of unskilled that are 
employed is one minus the unemployment rate. The number of citizens who are skilled is 
fixed as well, but the proportion that choose to work in the domestic economy is 
determined within the model. These individuals have the option of receiving the domestic 
skilled wage, r, and then paying tax rate, t, on that wage income, or of receiving an after-
tax wage of r* in the rest of the world. One of the equations in the model is r(1 – t) = r*, 
which stipulates that once the domestic government sets the tax rate, the domestic skilled 
wage is determined by this equation. Since we are treating physical capital in exactly the 
same manner as workers with human capital (skilled labour), the same relationship that 
connects domestic and foreign skilled-labour wage rates pins down the domestic interest 
rate as well. In short, this relationship imposes the globalization constraint. The taxes that 
are nominally levied on the “rich” (owners of all mobile factors of production) are passed 
on to the “poor” (immobile unskilled individuals), since increases in the domestic tax rate 
simply raise the pre-tax rates of return received by the “rich” mobile factor owners. Note 
that, because of this perfect-mobility specification, it is impossible for any domestic 
government policy to affect the skilled individuals or the capitalists at all. One of two 
things happens whenever the incomes of these individuals are threatened. Either these 
individuals are “compensated” by the adjustment in their pre-tax return that is just 
necessary (if they stay employing their factor domestically), or they move without cost to 
the rest of the world (and receive there exactly what they had been receiving   10
domestically). As a result, we know that these individuals are indifferent to all policies 
we examine. That is why we can focus exclusively on the policy-induced effect on the 
average income of the unskilled individuals (the z measure discussed above).   
  Finally, the government budget constraint states that the uses of government funds 
(spending on programs that have no direct effect on labour markets, the employment 
subsidy payments, and employment insurance) equal the sources of government funds 
(the net-of-credit taxes on all earned incomes). Only the unskilled qualify for the tax 
credit, and it is only when firms hire the unskilled that they qualify for the employment 
subsidy. Initially, it is assumed that there is no working income tax benefit and no 
employment subsidy, but that there is an untaxed employment insurance payment given 
to the unemployed – equal to one-third of the pre-tax unskilled wage. The ratio of other 
program spending to GDP is set at 20%, and the proportional income tax rate is set to 
balance the budget. 
 
3. A Framework for Evaluating a Narrowly-Targeted Earned-Income-Tax-Credit 
Policy  
          The second set of simulations that we report focuses specifically on a personal 
income tax cut that is offered to particularly poor households. Several alterations to the 
model are made to reflect the fact that the government’s Working Income Tax Benefit is 
a narrowly targeted program. Specifically, with the new policy, if a family receives more 
than about $15,000 annually, the size of that household’s tax break begins to be phased 
out. Once an annual income of about $22,000 is reached the household is too “rich” to 
qualify at all. Clearly, this initiative is not designed to affect 50% of the population.   11
Further, at these low income levels, it is likely that many individuals would be earning no 
more than the minimum wage. With a binding minimum wage, firms cannot choose the 
profit-maximizing wage. Thus, for the second set of reported simulations, we alter the 
model so that the minimum-wage constraint is binding for all the “poor.” We assume that 
this targeted group represents only 10%, not 50% of the population, and – to reflect the 
estimated Canadian Lorenz curve – we assume that this bottom 10% of the population 
receives 2% of national income. 
  A second alteration to the model concerns the labour-force-participation 
behaviour of the poor. In our assessment of widely available low-income-support 
programs, we simplified the model by assuming that the aggregate wage elasticity of 
labour supply is zero. This is an entirely reasonable assumption on empirical grounds. 
But for an analysis that restricts the low-income group to the very poor, the zero labour-
supply elasticity assumption is less appealing. Indeed, Finance Canada is hoping that 
some individuals may be tempted to join the labour force as a result of the Working 
Income Tax Benefit. To allow for this possibility, we consider values for the labour 
supply elasticity that range between zero and one in the simulations that concern the 
targeted-to-very-poor earned income tax credit. With a variable participation rate (that is, 
when p is not fixed at unity), the index of the poor's material welfare becomes  . pz v =  
  The final alteration in the model that is used to simulate the government’s limited 
initiative is that it is financed either by an increase in the tax on the rich, or by a cut in 
government spending. In either case, the amount involved involves the proportion of 
GDP that reflects the funding the federal government has actually earmarked for the 
Working Income Tax Benefit.   12
  In the simulations it is assumed that all poor individuals benefit (and to the same 
extent) from the program. As noted above, the actual policy involves both phase-in and 
phase-out ranges of income, within which individuals and families receive only partial 
benefit. Unfortunately, if the model were adjusted to allow for this feature in a thorough 
manner, we would have to allow for an entire range of differing abilities within the low-
skilled portion of the population. Such a re-specification would raise the level of 
complexity of the analysis, and detract from our intended focus – which is on open-
economy macroeconomic effects. Existing research has focused on partial-equilibrium 
analyses of labour market behaviour, and on the associated micro empirical work. Our 
strategy has been to highlight some important issues that have received less attention, and 
to accomplish this goal in a transparent fashion we need to use a highly aggregative 
framework. Nevertheless, we have constructed the model in a way that makes 
heterogeneity across agents of limited concern.   
The worker-effort function (which is taken directly from Summers (1988)) and 
the labour-force-participation-rate function both involve a constant-elasticity feature. 
This property implies that the aggregate labour-supply responses are the same no matter 
how the individual responses are distributed across individual poor households. As a 
result, even though we have not allowed some individuals to have their tax breaks 
reduced through phase-in or phase-out considerations, the simulations still provide the 
appropriate aggregate outcomes. This is true as long as we impose (as we do) that the 
government in the model provides the same total amount of tax relief as does the actual 
government policy, and as long as these constant-elasticity functional forms reflect actual 
behaviour. Of course, despite the fact that these functional forms are entirely standard, it   13
is possible that they do not. But even if this is the case, we know the direction of the bias 
that might be involved in our simulations, since they would then represent the maximum 
possible effects of the policy. And if our functional form assumptions are reasonably 
applicable to the “real world,” this “upward bias” in our estimated effects is likely to be 
quite small.  
  Some upward bias may remain, however, since we have assumed a 100% “take-
up” rate among potential beneficiaries of the policy. In actual fact, incomplete awareness 
of programs such as the Working Income Tax Benefit often results in less than a 100% 
utilization of the program by individuals. Our simulations involve the assumption that the 
government responds to this possibility by expanding the program so that all the 
designated funds are, in fact, spent. If this assumption about the government’s response to 
incomplete take-up rates is accurate, then there is no reason to suspect a significant 
upward bias in our simulations. 
 
4. Simulation Results: Broadly Available Low-Income Support Initiatives 
As noted above, we discuss our results in two stages. We begin with the broadly 
based initiatives that are made available to all low-income individuals – assumed to be 
50% of the population. In this setting, the emphasis is on comparing an earned income 
tax credit to alternative approaches to supporting the working poor. Following this 
discussion, in section 5, we focus on a Working Income Tax Benefit that is targeted to a 
much smaller, quite poor, segment of the population. 
For the broadly available initiatives, five simulations are reported. First, we 
introduce an earned income tax credit for the unskilled – as big an initiative that is   14
possible after the overall income tax rate (that is applied to earned incomes, net of any 
allowed credit, of all factor owners) is raised by one percentage point. Second, we 
introduce an employer employment subsidy for firms that hire unskilled individuals – 
again, as much as can be done with an increase in the general income tax rate of one 
percentage point.  
Some readers may prefer to consider financing these initiatives by cutting other 
program spending, or by using some of the room in the budget that would emerge as the 
government’s interest payment obligations shrink following a policy of debt reduction. 
For example, the Canadian government is expected to receive a “fiscal dividend” of about 
4% of GDP as the debt-to-GDP ratio falls from its peak in the early 1990s to its 20%-by-
2020 target. Still other readers may think that it might be better to dispense with either 
initiative, and simply use such new room in the government’s budget to finance a general 
tax cut. Such a policy would lead to more capital and skilled labour entering the country. 
With more complementary factors of production to work with, unskilled labour would be 
more productive, so pre-tax wages would increase. As a result, the unskilled would 
benefit, and perhaps by an even greater amount than with either an earned income tax 
credit or an employment subsidy. To ensure that we present results that will be of interest 
to readers who have any of these possible prior views, we report three further 
simulations. We cut other programs by one percentage point of GDP, and use the 
proceeds to finance three possible initiatives – the creation of an earned income tax 
credit, the creation of an employment subsidy, or the provision of a general tax cut.  
As explained above, none of the policies affect the net position of the “rich” (the 
skilled individuals or the capitalists). Thus, we focus on the material welfare of the   15
"poor" – specifically four outcomes in each case: the effects of the policy on the 
unemployment rate, the unskilled worker wage rate, the income tax rate, and summary 
measure z (the average income of an unskilled individual). The outcomes for these four 
measures, for all five policy experiments, are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Effects of Five Widely Available Low-Income Support Policies 
 
Variable Policy  1 Policy  2 Policy  3 Policy  4 Policy  5 
unemploy-  down by  down by  down by  down by  down by 
ment rate  1/10 of 1 pt  1/6 of 1 pt  1/6 of 1 pt  1/4 of 1 pt  1/20 of 1 pt 
 
wage   down  by  up  by   no   up  by   up  by 
rate   3%   1  %   change   4%   3% 
 
tax     up by    up by    no change  no change  down by  
rate   1%-point  1%-point      1%-point 
 
average  up by     down by  up by 4%  up by 4%  up by 4% 
income z  1/14 of 1%  1/12 of 1% 
 
 
Policy 1  Earned income tax credit financed by 1%-point increase in the tax rate 
Policy 2  Employment subsidy financed by 1%-point increase in the tax rate 
Policy 3  Earned income tax credit financed by 1%-point cut in other spending 
Policy 4  Employment subsidy financed by 1%-point cut in other spending 
Policy 5  General income tax cut financed by 1%-point cut in other spending 
 
 
The first thing readers will note is that the structural unemployment rate is 
reduced in all cases, by an amount ranging from one-twentieth of one percentage point to 
one-quarter of one percentage point. Given the purpose of these initiatives, this outcome 
is desirable, but the small magnitude may seem a bit discouraging.  
More encouraging is the effect on the average income of an unskilled individual. 
In three of the five cases, this measure increases by 4 percent. It appears that there is   16
nothing to choose between the three initiatives on this score. What is important is 
whether the initiatives are financed by a tax increase or a spending cut. Tax increases hurt 
the unskilled both directly and indirectly. The indirect effect follows from the fact that 
tax increases induce skilled individuals and capitalists to shift their factors to employment 
opportunities outside the country. With less of these complementary factors to work with 
in the domestic economy, the unskilled are less productive, and this development puts 
downward pressure on their market wage. With the earned income tax credit, a 3 percent 
fall in wages results. Overall, with this policy, there are four competing effects on the 
economic welfare of the unskilled. They are helped by the lower unemployment rate and 
by the tax credit, but they are hurt by the lower pre-tax wage and by the higher tax rate to 
which the tax credit applies. The formal model is required to assess the relative 
magnitude of these four effects, and – as indicated in column 1 of Table 1 – we find that 
the four effects just about exactly cancel off. There is a very small rise in the average 
income measure of the unskilled, but for all intents and purposes, no noticeable change.  
There are also competing effects with the employment subsidy. As Phelps has 
argued – other things equal – the subsidy raises the unskilled wage, so, in this case, we 
expect two favourable effects: higher wages and lower unemployment. But the 
unfavourable development – the higher tax rate – generates two undesirable outcomes. 
First, workers lose disposable income directly (through the higher tax), and – other things 
equal – there is downward pressure on their pre-tax wage (given that these individuals 
have less capital to work with). As already discussed, with the complementary inputs 
(skilled labour and physical capital) being less available (after the higher taxes have 
“pushed” some these factors out of the country) unskilled labour is less productive, so it   17
commands a lower wage. Phelps’s analysis did not consider this indirect negative effect, 
since his “closed economy” analysis abstracts from this “globalization” constraint. We 
see, in the “Policy 2” column in Table 1, that this effect is important, but it is not the 
dominant one; on balance, the unskilled wage does rise – but by only a small amount (1 
percent). As a result, the outcome which Phelps has stressed as an important feature of 
his proposal is much weaker than he expects it to be, and – overall – the average (after-
tax) income level of the unskilled actually falls by a small amount. All in all, when 
financed by higher taxes, neither the earned income tax credit nor the employment 
subsidy receives any significant support from our analysis.  
Readers may be puzzled as to why the average income of an unskilled individual 
falls slightly with the employment subsidy (Policy 2 in Table 1), while this summary 
measure increases slightly with the earned income tax credit (Policy 1 in Table 1). Given 
that the pre-tax wage rises more, and that the unemployment rate falls more, with the 
employment subsidy, why is it this policy that is slightly worse for the unskilled? This 
outcome emerges because the tax rate that applies with the employment subsidy, t, is 
bigger than the tax rate that confronts individuals who receive an earned income tax 
credit, t(1 – c).  
A different overall conclusion is warranted when the initiatives are financed by 
reallocating expenditures away from interest payments on the debt or from cutting other 
program spending (Policies 3, 4 and 5 in Table 1). In these cases, the average income of 
the unskilled measure rises by an impressive 4 percent. The main reason for this 
difference in results is that – in this case, with no increase in taxes – mobile capital is not 
induced to leave the country. Unskilled workers do not suffer the same loss in   18
productivity that was central to the earlier results, so in this case, their wages increase. In 
addition, a significant reduction in the unemployment rate accompanies both the earned 
income tax credit and the employment subsidy, so the analysis supports the proposition 
that either of these initiatives dominates a standard tax cut.  
 
5. Simulation Results: A Narrowly Targeted Earned-Income-Tax-Credit Policy 
  We now focus on a tax cut for low-income individuals that is not so widely 
available. We consider an earned income tax credit that is limited to just the poorest 10% 
of the population, who work at minimum-wage levels of remuneration and receive just 
2% of national income. These simulations are more relevant for evaluating actual 
government policy for two reasons. First, the policy in this version of the simulations is 
much more specifically targeted. Second, we examine a much smaller initiative – one that 
involves a commitment of funds that is equal to what the government will actually be 
spending on the Working Income Tax Benefit in a year’s time. 
Table 2. Effects of a Narrowly Targeted Earned Income Tax Credit in Four Settings 
 
Variable Setting  1 Setting  2 Setting  3 Setting  4  
unemploy-  down by  down by  down by  down by   
ment rate  1/6 of 1 pt  1/5 of 1 pt    1/6 of 1 pt  1/5 of 1 pt 
 
average  up by     up by    up by     up by      
income v  3.9%   4.3%   8.1%   8.6% 
 
 
Setting 1  financed by higher tax on rich; no change in labour-force participation 
Setting 2  financed by cut in spending; no change in labour-force participation 
Setting 3  financed by higher tax on rich; with change in labour-force participation 
Setting 4  financed by cut in spending; with change in labour-force participation 
 
   19
  We report four sets of outcomes in Table 2. There are two financing options (the 
tax break for the poor is financed either by a tax increase on the rich or by a cut in other 
program spending) and we report results both with and without a change in labour-force 
participation. With no change in labour force participation, and when the initiative is 
financed by a higher tax on the rich, we find that the earned income tax credit cuts the 
nation’s unemployment rate by one-sixth of one percentage point, and it raises the 
average income of the poor households by 3.9%. Compared to the more widely available 
initiative financed by higher taxes that was discussed in section 4 (Policy 1 in Table 1), 
this effect on average income is certainly more substantial. And, as above, we find even 
more impressive results when the initiative is financed without a tax increase on the rich. 
In this case, without the loss in labour productivity stemming from some capital 
relocating to the rest of the world, the average income indicator for the poor rises by 
4.3% (Setting 2 in Table 2). So the narrowly targeted Working Income Tax Benefit can 
be particularly helpful if it is financed out of the fiscal dividend that accompanies the 
ongoing debt reduction program. 
Even more encouraging results emerge when we allow the policy to lead to 
increased labour-force participation. With a labour-supply elasticity of unity, the increase 
in a poor individual’s average income is even bigger – over 8% (Settings 3 and 4 in Table 
2). The bottom line is that there is strong support for this initiative when it is narrowly 
targeted. Readers may have expected this outcome, since targeting the initiative to just 
the very poor means smaller overall revenue needs, and a smaller increase in the tax on 
capital means less capital leaving the country. Further, with the minimum-wage 
constraint, the increased willingness to work cannot put downward pressure on the pre-  20
tax wage rate (so Phelps’ main critique cannot apply). Nevertheless, these considerations 
are only two of the several effects that interact within the full macroeconomic framework, 
so detailed simulations were needed. It is reassuring that the results are consistent with 
existing partial-equilibrium analyses such as Eissa and Nichols (2005) and Neumark and 
Wascher (2007) – studies suggesting that important benefits for some particular low-
income groups can be attributed to the earned income tax credit in the United States. 
    
6. Conclusions 
Overall, our analysis supports three conclusions. First, the government should 
finance its attack on the “welfare wall” by reserving some of the “fiscal dividend” for this 
initiative. Initially, it should decide how much of the new room in its budget (that is 
emerging as interest payments on the debt shrink) is to be devoted to attacking the 
“welfare wall.” It should then declare that this part of the fiscal dividend is unavailable 
for spending increases in other areas, or for general tax cuts. Our second conclusion is 
that, as long as this bold earmarking of funds is imposed, either the earned income tax 
credit, or the alternative that Phelps prefers (employment subsidies) can be implemented 
– with essentially the same effects to be expected. The third conclusion that follows from 
our analysis is that – despite the modest size of the government’s current commitment to 
the Working Income Tax Benefit – we can expect a worthwhile increase in the living 
standards of the targeted subset of the working poor.    21
Appendix 
For readers who wish to experiment with extensions or sensitivity tests of our analysis, 
we list the specific equations in this Appendix. The production process is defined by a 
standard Cobb-Douglas relationship:  . ) (
1 a aK qN A Y
− =  Y , N and K refer to output, 
employment of unskilled individuals, and employment of broadly defined capital (skilled 
individuals and physical machines). The quality of unskilled labour, q, depends on 
worker effort, and this depends on how happy the worker is (compared to her outside 
option, z):   . ] / ) )) 1 ( 1 ( [(
d z z c t w q − − − =  w, t, c and d denote the unskilled-worker wage, 
the general income tax rate, the earned income tax credit rate, and the workers’ 
propensity to “shirk” on the job. With no propensity to shirk (d = 0), there is no incentive 
for firms to offer wages higher than the market-clearing level, so there is no 
unemployment. As noted in the text, parameter d is set so that the model involves a 
sensible initial structural unemployment rate of 6 percent for the nation as a whole. As in 
Summers (1988), the outside option is a weighted average, since individuals may get 
another job after a separation, or they may become unemployed: 
. ))] 1 ( 1 ( )[ 1 ( ufw c t w u z + − − − =  u and f are the unemployment rate and the “replacement 
rate” within the employment insurance system.  
  Without a minimum-wage constraint, profit maximization by firms leads to three 
relationships – that firms hire the two factors so that the marginal products equal the 
appropriate rental prices, and that they set the unskilled wage to their best advantage. As 
noted, this non-market clearing wage leads to unemployment among the unskilled. The 
relationships are:  r K aY = ) / ( ,  ) 1 ( / ) 1 ( s w N Y a − = −  and 
]. ) 1 ( 1 /[ )] 1 ))( 1 ( 1 ( [ f c t s c t d u − − − − − − =  The new notation, s, denotes the employment   22
subsidy rate. There is a fixed number of unskilled individuals (units chosen to equal 
unity). The proportion of these individuals who are in the labour force is p, so 
employment, N, equals  ). 1 ( u p −  The participation rate depends on the after-tax wage: 
. ))) 1 ( 1 ( (
e c t w p − − =  We consider values for the labour-supply elasticity in the zero-to-
one range  ). 1 0 ( ≤ ≤ e  The index of the poor's material welfare is  . pz v =  The supply 
relationship for the other (internationally mobile) factor was explained in the text: 
* ) 1 ( r t r = − .  
  When the minimum-wage constraint binds, the unemployment-rate equation 
given in the previous paragraph is removed from the model. Employment is then 
determined by combining the exogenous minimum wage value with the labour-demand 
relationship. 
The final equation in the model is the government budget constraint. For the 
results reported in Table 1, we have  . ] ) 1 ( [ G swN fwu rK c wN t + + = + −  This 
relationship states that tax revenue (which equals the tax rate times the taxable earnings 
of both factor owners) is used to finance the three expenditures (on employment 
insurance, employment subsidies and other programs, G). When formally solving the 
model, we divide this last equation through by GDP (Y), and then simplify by using 
several of the other relationships. g = G/Y is then taken as a variable that can be lowered 
by one percentage point when we consider initiatives that are not financed by a tax 
increase.  
To examine the effects of introducing either an earned income tax credit or an 
employment subsidy, the nine equations are solved to determine how Y, N, K, u, w, r, q, z   23
and either c or s respond to an assumed one-percentage point change in either t or g (c 
and s are assumed to be zero initially). 
Some readers might object to our specification of the production process since it 
allows firms in the model to substitute one input for another with more ease than may be 
possible in reality. To examine this concern, we re-worked our analysis with a 
specification of technology that has been suggested by Thomas Moutos (Moutos and 
Scarth (2001)). In this alternative set up, which is a simplified version of the “O-ring” 
specification (Kremer (1993)), the production process involves a strict limit to how much 
firms can get along without skilled labour. Modern production operations seem to permit 
unskilled labour and physical capital to be substitutes for one another. For example, firms 
can use capital (robotics), or unskilled workers, but skilled workers are needed in either 
case (either to design and program the robots or to supervise the unskilled). Thus, 
following this “O-ring” approach, we specify that skilled labour is absolutely essential to 
production, while unskilled labour and physical capital can be substituted for one another 
with an elasticity of substitution equal to unity. This specification is consistent with what 
many analysts regard to be the essence of the modern economy – that it is “knowledge 
based.” In this alternative specification, two relationships define the production process:  
bY L = and , ) (
1 a aK qN A Y
− = where L denotes skilled labour, and K now refers to just 
physical capital. The factor demand functions for physical capital and unskilled labour 
are  r K aY bx = − ) / )( 1 (  and  ), 1 ( ) / ) 1 )(( 1 ( s w N Y a bx − = − −  and the supply relationship 
for skilled individuals is  *, ) 1 ( x t x = − where x and x* denote the domestic and foreign 
levels of the skilled wage rate. Finally, the revised government budget constraint is 
. ] ) 1 ( [ G swN fwu xL rK c wN t + + = + + −  When this model is calibrated to have the   24
same initial distribution of income as in the basic model, all results are very similar. 
Thus, our conclusions remain appropriate in the face of this sensitivity test.  
When the focus shifts to a tax cut for a more targeted (smaller) group of low-
income individuals, we define two different tax rates, so the government budget 
constraint is revised:  . G swN fwu hrK twN + + = +  We cut t by just the amount that 
involves the government losing 0.00067 of one percentage point of GDP from its revenue 
sources. We do so since the government has earmarked $1 billion annually to the 
Working Income Tax Benefit and GDP is roughly $1.5 trillion. As a result, these 
simulations are intended to reflect the actual government initiative. In the model, this 
revenue loss in financed in two ways (either by an increase in h (the income tax rate 
levied on the rich) or by a cut in the program spending rate, g, that involves the same 
revenue implications). 
Calibration concerning income shares varies depending on whether the low-
income support policies are broadly available or not. In the former case, as explained in 
the text, we set a = 0.67. To appreciate that this calibration is reasonable, it is useful to 
consider the equality between capital’s marginal product and its market yield. With the 
pre-policy yield set at 12%, the a = 0.67 assumption implies that the capital/output ratio 
is 5.5. If capital referred to just physical capital, we would judge this ratio to be about 
double what is appropriate for the Canadian economy. But we follow Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil (1992) who assume a Cobb-Douglas exponent of one-third for both physical 
and human capital. Thus, our more broadly defined capital/output ratio should be double 
the usual number that is associated with just physical capital. Another way of 
appreciating the applicability of our calibration is to focus on unemployment. With   25
unemployment restricted to the poorer half of the population, u = 0.12 yields an entirely 
reasonable initial economy-wide unemployment rate of 6%. In the more targeted case, we 
focus on the fact that the poorest 10% of the Canadian population receives 2% of the 
income (quite appropriate – given estimates of the Canadian Lorenz curve). Thus, in this 
specification, we specify that a = 0.98 and u = 0.60 (so that, as in the other simulations, 
the initial economy-wide unemployment rate is 6%). Finally, in this minimum-wage case, 
the value of the initial unemployment rate does not pin down parameter d. To ensure that 
the assumed unemployment rate among the very poor is not too much above what would 
emerge if there were not a minimum wage, we set d equal to 0.3. Our results are not 
sensitive to changes in the assumed value of this parameter.   26
References 
 
Eissa and Nichols (2005), “Tax-Transfer Policy and Labor-Market Outcomes,” 
American Economic Review 95, 88-93. 
Finance Canada (2007), The Budget Plan: Aspire to a Stronger, Safer, Better 
Canada.  
Kremer, M. (1993), “The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 108, 551-575. 
Mankiw, G., D. Romer and D. Weil (1992), “A Contribution to the Empirics of 
Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 88, 407-437. 
Moutos, T. and W. Scarth (2001), “Some Macroeconomic Consequences of Basic 
Income and Employment Subsidies,” presented at a CESIfo conference on Labor Market 
Institutions and Public Regulation. 
Neumark and Wascher (2007), “Minimum Wages, the Earned Income Tax Credit, 
and Employment: Evidence from the Post-Welfare-Reform Era,” NBER Working Paper 
12915. 
Phelps, E. S. (1997), Rewarding Work: How to Restore Participation and Self-
Support to Free Enterprise (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press). 
Summers, L. H. (1988), “Relative Wages, Efficiency Wages and Keynesian 
Unemployment,” The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 78, 383-388.   
 SEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS: Recent Releases
Number Title Author(s)        
27
(2005)
No. 124: Exploring the Use of a Nonparametrically Generated
Instrumental Variable in the Estimation of a Linear Parametric
Equation
F.T. Denton




No. 126: Entry Costs and Stock Market Participation Over the Life
Cycle
S. Alan
No. 127: Income Inequality and Self-Rated Health Status:  Evidence
from the European Community Household Panel
V. Hildebrand
P. Van Kerm




No. 129: Survey Results of the New Health Care Worker Study: 







No. 130: Does One Size Fit All?  The CPI and Canadian Seniors M. Brzozowski




No. 132: Grandparents Raising Grandchildren in Canada: A Profile of
Skipped Generation Families
E. Fuller-Thomson
No. 133: Measurement Errors in Recall Food Expenditure Data N. Ahmed
M. Brzozowski
T.F. Crossley
No. 134: The Effect of Health Changes and Long-term Health on the
Work Activity of Older Canadians 
D.W.H. Au
T. F. Crossley
M.. SchellhornSEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS: Recent Releases
Number Title Author(s)        
28
No. 135: Population Aging and the Macroeconomy: Explorations in the
Use of Immigration as an Instrument of Control
F. T. Denton
B. G. Spencer





No. 137: MEDS-D USERS’ MANUAL F.T. Denton 
C.H. Feaver 
B.G.. Spencer
No. 138: MEDS-E USERS’ MANUAL F.T. Denton 
C.H. Feaver 
B.G. Spencer
No. 139: Socioeconomic Influences on the Health of Older Canadians: 
Estimates Based on Two Longitudinal Surveys





No. 140: Developing New Strategies to Support Future Caregivers of





No. 141: Les Premiers Baby-Boomers Québécois font-ils une Meilleure
Préparation Financière à la Retraite que leurs Parents?




No. 142: Welfare Restructuring without Partisan Cooperation:
The Role of Party Collusion in Blame Avoidance
M. Hering
No. 143: Ethnicity and Health: An Analysis of Physical Health




No. 144: The Health Behaviours of Immigrants and Native-Born People
in Canada
J.T. McDonald




No. 146: Population Aging in Canada: Software for Exploring the




B.G. SpencerSEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS: Recent Releases
Number Title Author(s)        
29
(2006)
No. 147: The Portfolio Choices of Hispanic Couples D.A. Cobb-Clark
V.A. Hildebrand
No. 148: Inter-provincial Migration of Income among Canada’s Older
Population:1996-2001
K.B. Newbold
No. 149: Joint Taxation and the Labour Supply of Married Women:
Evidence from the Canadian Tax Reform of 1988
T.F. Crossley
S.H. Jeon
No. 150: What Ownership Society? Debating Housing and Social
Security Reform in the United States
D. Béland
No. 151: Home Cooking, Food Consumption and Food Production
among the Unemployed and Retired Households
M. Brzozowski
Y. Lu




No. 153: Do the Rich Save More in Canada? S. Alan
K. Atalay
T.F. Crossley
No. 154: Income Inequality over the Later-life Course: A Comparative
Analysis of Seven OECD Countries
R.L. Brown
S.G. Prus




No. 156: The Top Shares of Older Earners in Canada M.R. Veall
No. 157: Le soutien aux personnes âgées en perte d’autonomie:
 jusqu’où les baby-boomers pourront-ils compter sur leur


















The Diversification and the Privatization of the Sources of




No. 160: Evaluating Pension Portability Reforms: The Tax Reform Act
of 1986 as a Natural Experiment
V. Andrietti
V.A. HildebrandSEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS: Recent Releases
Number Title Author(s)        
30





No. 162: Physician Labour Supply in Canada: A Cohort Analysis T.F. Crossley
J. Hurley
S.H. Jeon




No. 164: The Healthy Immigrant Effect and Immigrant Selection:




No. 165: Well-Being Throughout the Senior Years: An Issues Paper on
Key Events and Transitions in Later Life
M. Denton
K. Kusch
No. 166: Satisfied Workers, Retained Workers: Effects of Work and
Work Environment on Homecare Workers’ Job Satisfaction,
Stress, Physical Health, and Retention
I.U. Zeytinoglu
M. Denton
No. 167: Contrasting Inequalities: Comparing Correlates of Health in






No. 168: Health human resources planning and the production of health:
Development of an extended analytical framework for needs-







No. 169: Gender Inequality in the Wealth of Older Canadians M. Denton
L. Boos
No. 170: The Evolution of Elderly Poverty in Canada K. Milligan
No. 171: Return and Onwards Migration among Older Canadians:
Findings from the 2001 Census
K.B. Newbold
No. 172: Le système de retraite américain: entre fragmentation et
logique financière
D. BélandSEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS: Recent Releases
Number Title Author(s)        
31
No. 173: Entrepreneurship, Liquidity Constraints and Start-up Costs R. Fonseca
P.-C. Michaud
T. Sopraseuth
No. 174: How did the Elimination of the Earnings Test above the
Normal Retirement Age affect Retirement Expectations?
P.-C. Michaud
A. van Soest









No. 177: Retirement Saving in Australia G. Barrett
Y.-P. Tseng




No. 179: Older Workers and On-the-Job Training in Canada:




No. 180: Private Pensions and Income Security in Old Age:
An Uncertain Future – Conference Report
M. Hering
M. Kpessa
No. 181: Age, SES, and Health: A Population Level Analysis of Health
Inequalitites over the Life Course
S. Prus





No. 183: Home and Mortgage Ownership of the Dutch Elderly:
Explaining Cohort, Time and Age Effects
A. van der Schors
R.J.M. Alessie
M. Mastrogiacomo








T. AndreyevaSEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS: Recent Releases
Number Title Author(s)        
32
No. 186: Which Canadian Seniors Are Below the Low-Income
Measure?
M.R. Veall
No. 187: Policy Areas Impinging on Elderly Transportation Mobility:








No. 189: Psychosocial resources and social health inequalities in




No. 190: Health-Care Utilization in Canada: 25 Years of Evidence L.J. Curtis
W.J. MacMinn
No. 191: Health Status of On and Off-reserve Aboriginal Peoples:
Analysis of the Aboriginal Peoples Survey
L.J. Curtis
No. 192: On the Sensitivity of Aggregate Productivity Growth Rates to
Noisy Measurement
F.T. Denton
No. 193: Initial Destination Choices of Skilled-worker Immigrants from




No. 194: Problematic Post-Landing Interprovincial Migration of the
Immigrants in Canada: From 1980-83 through 1992-95
L. Xu
K.L. Liaw
No. 195: Inter-CMA Migration of the Immigrants in Canada: 1991-
1996 and 1996-2001
L. Xu
No. 196: Characterization and Explanation of the 1996-2001 Inter-
CMA Migration of the Second Generation in Canada
L. Xu
No. 197: Transitions out of and back to employment among older men
and women in the UK
D. Haardt
No. 198: Older couples’ labour market reactions to family disruptions D. Haardt
No. 199: The Adequacy of Retirement Savings: Subjective Survey




No. 200: Underfunding of Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Benefit
Guarantee Insurance - An Overview of Theory and Empirics
M. Jametti
No. 201: Effects of ‘authorized generics’ on Canadian drug prices P. GrootendorstSEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS: Recent Releases
Number Title Author(s)        
33
No. 202: When Bad Things Happen to Good People: The Economic




No. 203: Relatively Inaccessible Abundance: Reflections on U.S.
Health Care
I.L. Bourgeault
No. 204: Professional Work in Health Care Organizations: The






No. 205: Who Minds the Gate? Comparing the role of non physician
providers in the primary care division of labour in Canada &
the U.S.
I.L. Bourgeault
No. 206: Immigration, Ethnicity and Cancer in U.S. Women J.T. McDonald
J. Neily
No. 207: Ordinary Least Squares Bias and Bias Corrections for iid
Samples
L. Magee
No. 208: The Roles of Ethnicity and Language Acculturation in
Determining the Interprovincial Migration Propensities in
Canada: from the Late 1970s to the Late 1990s
X. Ma
K.L. Liaw
No. 209: Aging, Gender and Neighbourhood Determinants of Distance
Traveled: A Multilevel Analysis in the Hamilton CMA
R. Mercado
A. Páez




No. 211: Explaining the Health Gap between Canadian- and Foreign-




No. 212: “Midlife Crises”: Understanding the Changing Nature of
Relationships in Middle Age Canadian Families
K.M. Kobayashi
No. 213: A Note on Income Distribution and Growth W. Scarth
No. 214: Is Foreign-Owned Capital a Bad Thing to Tax? W. Scarth
No. 215: A review of instrumental variables estimation in the applied
health sciences
P. Grootendorst
No. 216: The Impact of Immigration on the Labour Market Outcomes
of Native-born Canadians
J. TuSEDAP RESEARCH PAPERS: Recent Releases
Number Title Author(s)        
34
No. 217: Caregiver Employment Status and Time to Institutionalization
of  Persons with Dementia
M. Oremus
P. Raina
No. 218: The Use of Behaviour and Mood Medications by Care-





No. 219: Looking for Private Information in Self-Assessed Health J. Banks
T. Crossley
S. Goshev
No. 220: An Evaluation of the Working Income Tax Benefit W. Scarth
L. Tang